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Individual Choice Sequences
in the Work of L.E.J. Brouwer
Joop Niekus
ILLC Amsterdam
Résumé : Par des suites de choix, nous comprenons des suites qui ne sont
pas déterminées complètement par une loi arithmétique. Elles sont des objets
caractéristiques de l’intuitionnisme de Brouwer. Nous prétendons qu’à partir
de 1927, l’utilisation par Brouwer de suites de choix particulières n’est pas
reconnu comme tel. Nous prétendons que l’utilisation de ces suites dans la
méthode du sujet créatif, après la seconde guerre mondiale, n’a pas à être
mis en relation avec l’utilisation de celles-ci dans les années vingt et qu’elles
sont mal interprétées. Nous montrons où se trouvent ces suites de choix dans
l’œuvre de Brouwer et comment elles doivent être traitées.
Abstract: Choice sequences are sequences not completely determined by an
algorithmic law. We maintain that the introduction of particular choice se-
quences by Brouwer in the late twenties was not recognised as such. We claim
that their later use in the method of the creative subject was not traced back
to this original usage and has been misinterpreted. We show where these par-
ticular choice sequences appear in the work of Brouwer and we show how they
should be handled.
Philosophia Scientiæ, cahier spécial 5, 2005, 217–232.
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1 Introduction
Brouwer made his first steps in the foundations of mathematics in his
thesis of 1907 ([Brouwer 1907]). In the decade after this his main concern
was topology. He returned to the foundations in 1918 when he presented
with [Brouwer 1918] a reconstruction of mathematics along the lines set
out in his thesis. The reconstruction, called intuitionism, has two striking
features. Firstly, it is independent on the law of the excluded middle.
Secondly, real numbers are introduced by infinitely proceeding sequences
with terms chosen more or less freely from objects already constructed:
choice sequences. He kept publishing on the subject until 1930.
After a lapse of more than fifteen years he started to publish again on
the subject in 1948. Characteristic for his papers in this second period of
intuitionistic activity is a technique for deriving counterexamples against
consequences of the law of the excluded middle. The technique has
generally been considered to be radically new; in this period it is known
as the method of the creative subject.
Extensive research has been done on choice sequences. The standard
text on the subject is A.S. Troelstra’s monograph [Troelstra 77]. This
work is based on ideas originating with G. Kreisel (see [Kreisel 1963],
[Kreisel 1968] and [Kreisel and Troelstra 1970]). It contains a consid-
erable amount of technical work on formal systems of classes of choice
sequences. For these systems Troelstra proves elimination theorems: a
sentence with quantification over choice sequences can be translated into
an equivalent sentence without choice sequences. So, what can be proved
with choice sequences can also be proved without them.
The formal systems of [Troelstra 77] are not relevant for the method
of the creative subject. In order to reconstruct this method, Kreisel and
Troelstra developed the theory of the idealised mathematician. From
seemingly straightforward assumptions concerning the properties of the
idealised mathematician, Troelstra derived a paradox, which could not
be resolved satisfactorily, see [Troelstra and van Dalen 1988, 842-846]
and our analysis in [Niekus 1987, 434-436]. The method of the creative
subject is controversial, also within intuitionism.
The subject of this paper is Brouwer’s use of individual choice se-
quences, which are particular sequences of which the terms are not al-
gorithmically determined. They have not been an object of study af-
ter Brouwer; the research was concentrated on global properties. They
do not occur in [Troelstra 77], or in [Troelstra 82], a survey article on
Brouwer’s use of choice sequences. Our aim is twofold. Firstly we want to
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show where individual choice sequences appear in the work of Brouwer;
secondly we want to show how they should be treated.
In Section 3 we give the first example known to us that Brouwer
deliberately uses an individual choice sequence. It is from a lecture in
1927, but not published until 1991 ([Brouwer 91]). We also give the
first in print, which is in [Brouwer 30]. Further we cite a fragment
from [Brouwer 48], which we think shows without doubt, that Brouwer
is exploiting individual choice sequences, as introduced in 1927, in the
method of the creative subject.
All three examples of choice sequences deal with the same result:
the non-equivalence of apartness and inequality. Only in [Br 48] does
Brouwer give a proof, which we shall analyse in the Section 4. In our view
the properties of a choice sequence are determined during the construc-
tion, which is in the future. So reasoning about a choice sequence should
involve principles of the logic of time. We shall use one very obvious in
our reconstruction. We do not use an idealised mathematician.
In Section 5 we shall compare our reconstruction with the recon-
struction with the idealised mathematician, which is the standard one
in intuitionism.
We start in Section 2 with the necessary definitions.
2 Definitions
In intuitionism, mathematics consists of mental constructions of the hu-
man individual only; there are no mathematical truths outside the hu-
man mind. The prime material for these constructions is the sequence
of natural numbers N. Of this sequence the first element is given and
every next one is constructible from its predecessors. They have their
origin in “our perception of the move of time” ( [Brouwer 1981, 4]).
From the natural numbers the integers Z and rational numbers Q
can be constructed in a standard way. The resulting mathematics up to
this point is contained in classical mathematics. It is the introduction of
real numbers by infinitely proceeding sequences that gives intuitionism
its special character. We shall use for this purpose sequences of rational
numbers (an) that are constructed in the following way:
Any q ∈ Q is admitted as a choice for the first element a0; q ∈ Q
is admitted as next element an+1 in the already constructed sequence
a0, a1, . . ., an iff |an − q| < 2−n.
A thus constructed sequence is a real number generator (rng).
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If the construction is completely determined by an algorithmic law
from the first term onward, we call the rng a lawlike sequence. We re-
serve the name choice sequence for rng’s having no complete algorithmic
description. Brouwer called these sequences “unfertig”, which is Ger-
man for incomplete. Such a sequence reaches its completion during the
construction. We shall see examples of these incomplete objects below.
Between two rng’s (an) and (bn) we define the relation R by
(an)R(bn) iff ∀k ∃n ∀m > n |am − bm| < 2
−k.
R is an equivalence relation. The real numbers are the equivalence
classes of this relation. They form the full continuum, also called the
continuum. The reduced continuum is formed by the equivalence classes
of R restricted to the lawlike rng’s. We shall denote real numbers by
a, b, . . .x, y, . . . Arithmetical operations and relations can be defined on
real numbers via the representatives, as in the following definitions.
a < b iff for representatives (an) and (bn)
∃k ∃n ∀m (bn+m − an+m) > 2
−k,
a > b iff b < a,
a#b iff a < b or b < a.
Since in intuitionism a proof of ∃nA(n) requires a proof ofA(n0) for some
specific n0, one should distinguish between the apartness relation a#b
and the inequality relation a = b. The latter expression means ¬(a = b),
i.e. the supposition of a = b is contradictory. Each of the three examples
of choice sequences in section 3 deals with the non-equivalence of these
two relations.
The way we introduced real numbers is by no means exclusive. We
could have used another modulus of convergence in the definition of R,
e.g. k−1 instead of 2−k. We could have add a clause in our defini-
tion of rng’s that q is of the form a.2−n, a ∈ Z, n ∈ N, in which case
rng’s are infinite convergent sequences of dual fractions. Instead of se-
quences of rational numbers we could have used sequences of intervals
of rational numbers. In one of the examples below Brouwer had in-
troduced the real numbers by sequences the n-th term a λ(n)-interval,
which is encompassed by its predecessor. A λ(n)-interval has the form
[a.2−n−1, (a+ 2).2−n−1], with a ∈ Z, n ∈ N. There is no essential differ-
ence between these definitions; they result in the same continuum.
Individual Choice Sequences in the Work of L.E.J. Brouwer 221
3 Individual choice sequences — where they
appear
Brouwer started to explore the distinction reduced versus full continuum
in his Berlin lectures of 1927, the text not published until 1991 ([Brouwer
91]). In the following way he showed that the above defined relation <
is not a “full” order on the reduced continuum.1
Let k be the smallest number such that the k-th up to the k + 9-th
digit in the decimal expansion of pi form the sequence 0123456789. We
define (bn) as follows:
bn = 0 iff n < k
bn = (−2)
−k iff n  k.
The sequence (bn) clearly generates a real number, say r. Given an
algorithm to calculate the digits of the decimal expansion of pi, (bn) is
completely algorithmic, so r is an element of the reduced continuum. For
this real number Brouwer claims that neither r < 0, nor r > 0, nor r = 0
holds. He concludes: < is not a full order on the reduced continuum.
1In the original German text the proof that < is not a full order on the reduced
continuum and not an order on the continuum were interwoven. The original text:
Wir wollen zunächtst zeigen, daß das naive “vor” und nach weder im Kon-
tinuum noch im reduzierten Kontinuum eine Ordnung, geschweige denn eine
“vollständige” Ordnung der Punkkerne abgibt. Dazu betrachten wir eine math-
ematische Entität oder Species S, eine Eigenschaft E, und definieren wie folgt
den Punkt s des Kontinuums: Das n-te λ-Intervall λn ist eine symmetrischum
den Nullpunkte gelegenes λ(n−1)-Intervall, so lange man die Gültigheit noch
die Absurdität von E für S kennt, dagegen ist es ein symmetrisch um den
Punkt 2−m, bzw. um den Punkt −2−m gelegenes λ(n)-Intervall, wenn n  m
und zwischen der Wahl des (m − 1)-ten und der Wahl des m-ten Intervalles
ein Beweis der Gültigkeit bzw. der Absurdität von E für S gefunden worden
ist. Weiter bezeichnen wir mit k1 die kleinste natürliche Zahl n mit der Eigen-
schaft, daß die n-te bis (n + 9)-te Ziffer der Dezimalbruchenentwicklung von pi
eine Sequenz 0123456789 bilden und dazu definieren wir wie folgt den Punkt r
des reduzierten Kontinuums: Das n-te λ-Intervall λn ist ein symmetrisch um
den Nullpunkt gelegenes λ(n−1)-Intervall, solange n < k1; für n  k1 aber ist
λn das symmetrisch um den Punkt (−2)−k1 gelegene λ(n). Alsdann ist der
zu s gehörende Punktkern des Kontinuums = 0, aber solange man weder die
Absurdität noch die Absurdität der Absurdität von E für S kennt, weder > 0
noch < 0. Bis zum stattfinden einer dieser beide Entdeckungen kannalso das
Kontinuum nicht geordnet sein. Weiter ist der zu r gehörende Punktkern des
reduziertes Kontinuums, solange die Existenz von k1 weder bewiesen noch noch
ad absurdum geführt ist, weder = 0, noch > 0, noch < 0. Bis zum stattfinden
einer dieser beiden Entdeckungen ist also das reduzierte Kontinuum nicht voll-
ständig geordnet. ([Brouwer 1991, 31-32]).
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Note the role of time in this argument. Neither r < 0 nor r > 0 did
hold for Brouwer because he could not give a specific natural number n0
such that k = n0. Recently it has been discovered that k exists and that
it is even, so r > 0 holds now.2
“Neither r < 0 nor r > 0 hold” is an example of the weak negation,
expressing just the absence of a proof. The strong negation of an as-
sertion A means that from the assumption of A a contradiction can be
derived. Although both negations appear in Brouwer’s work, only the
strong negation has been formalised in intuitionistic logic. It is with re-
spect to the strong negation that Brouwer refutes the law of the excluded
middle: A ∨ ¬A holds when either a proof of A is available or a proof
showing its contradictority. As long as there are unsolved mathematical
problems, it is of course not generally valid.
A property of the strong negation is that ¬¬A is not equivalent with
A, it is weaker. Therefore ¬¬A ∨ ¬A, which we shall meet below, is
weaker than A ∨ ¬A.
The technique for showing > is not a full order on the reduced con-
tinuum, was not new. Already in [Brouwer 1908] Brouwer used unknown
properties of the decimal expansion of pi to demonstrate the unreliability
of the law of the excluded middle. But he proved a stronger statement
for the full continuum. He constructed a real number a such that a = 0
holds, but neither a > 0 nor a < 0 can be proved. This argument was
new, and it was special. It runs as follows:
Let A be a proposition which is not tested, i.e. neither ¬A nor ¬¬A
has been proved. In connection with this proposition A we define the
sequence (an) as follows.
• an = 0 as long as, at the choice of an, neither A nor ¬A has been
proved;
• ak+n = 2
−k, for all n, if a proof of A has been found between the
choice of ak−1 and ak;
• ak+n = −2
−k, for all n, if a proof of ¬A has been found between
the choice of ak−1 and ak.
This sequence generates a real number a, for which a = 0 holds, but
as long as neither A nor ¬A has been proved, neither a > 0 nor a < 0
holds. Brouwer concludes: as long as neither one of these proofs has
been found, the continuum is not ordered.
2According to [Borwein 1998], k = 17, 387, 594, 880.
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The sequence generating a above depends on whether or not some
proof will be found, so it is not algorithmic. It is the first time that
Brouwer deliberately gives an example of a choice sequence.3 He does
not give further argument here for the result. We delay our first comment
till the next choice sequence, which is in [Brouwer 30], the text of his
second Vienna lecture of 1928.
After the Berlin lectures Brouwer generalized his pi-expansion tech-
nique by introducing the notion of a fleeing property f for natural num-
bers. It satisfies the following conditions: for each natural number it is
decidable whether it possesses f or not, no natural number possessing f
is known, the assumption of the existence of a numberf is not known to
be contradictory. The critical number λf of a fleeing property f is the
smallest natural number possessing f .
For Brouwer the standard example of a fleeing property for a natural
number m was the m-th digit in the decimal expansion of pi being the
first of the row 0123456789, as we saw above. The real number r defined
there is an example of a dual checking number of that fleeing property.
Since for this property λf is now known, it is not a fleeing property
anymore.
Brouwer applied the new notion in [Br 30], the text of the second
of two lectures he held in Vienna in 1928. He examines the continuum
with regard to seven properties, all classically valid. Each time he dis-
tinguishes between the reduced and the full continuum. When sufficient,
he uses a lawlike real, as below:
That the continuum (and also the reduced continuum) is not discrete
follows from the fact that the number 1/2 + pf , with pf the dual checking
number of the fleeing property f , is neither equal to 1/2, nor apart from
1/2.
4
3In his proof of the negative continuity theorem of [Brouwer 1927] Brouwer may
seem to use an individual choice sequence. This precedes the famous continuity
theorem. According to Brouwer the theorem is, contrary to the continuity theorem,
an immediate consequence of basic intuitionistic principles, and its proof appears in
his lectures from 1918 (contrary to the continuity theorem). However, the proof is
not at all clear. There are, among others, reconstructions in [Posy 1976], [Martino
1985] and [Troelstra 1982], all different.
Brouwer continuously developed his ideas on choice sequences during his entire
career. As it seems to us the notion of choice sequence was not sufficiently crystallized
out when he used it in [Brouwer 1927]. At least he never used it again in the same
manner. In [Brouwer 1981, 81] Brouwer proves the negative continuity theorem again.
Whereas he was fully exploiting choice sequences as introduced in [Brouwer 1991] in
his method of the creating subject, he now uses a lawlike sequence in his proof.
The second proof is not taken into consideration in the reconstructions mentioned.
4“Daß das Kontinuum (und ebenso das reduzierte Kontinuum) nicht diskret ist,
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But if necessary he uses a choice sequence:
That < is not an order on the continuum is demonstrated by the real
number p, generated by the sequence (cn), its terms chosen such that c1 = 0
and cv = cv+1 with only the following exception. Whenever I find the
critical number λf of some particular fleeing property f , I choose the next
cv equal to−2
−v, and when I find a proof this critical number does not exist,
I choose cv equal to 2
−v. This number p is unequal to 0, but nevertheless
it is not apart from zero.5
Note the difference between these two sequences. If for some natural
number m it is proved that m = λf , then the number defined in the first
fragment becomes 1/2 + 2−m. Such a relation does not follow from the
definition in the second case.
Since the Berlin lecture notes were not published until 1991, the
sequence used in the second fragment is the first choice sequence of
Brouwer in print. It is a peculiar fact that this sequence has never been
recognised as something special.6 Whether the sequence is the same as
in his Berlin lecture depends on whether one may conclude from the
definition of a fleeing property that it is non-tested. An indication that
Brouwer intended to give the same example is that in [Brouwer 48],
which we treat below, he gave the fleeing property used in the definition
of r in [Brouwer 91] as an example of a non-tested proposition. As in
[Brouwer 91], there is no further proof of the above result, or of the
results obtained with other choice sequences.7
As any infinite sequence in intuitionism, a choice sequence is given
by a description of the construction of its terms. But the description
does not determine the sequence algorithmically. In the examples above
folgt z. B. daraus, daß die Zahl 1/2 + pf , wo pf die duale pendelzahl der fliehenden
Eigenschaft f vorstellt, weder gleich 1/2 noch von 1/2 verschieden ist.” ([Brouwer
1975, 435]).
5“Daß das Kontinuum durch die der Anschauung entnommene Reihenfolge ihrer
Elemente nicht geordnet ist, erweist sich am Elemente p, für dessen bestimmte
konvergente Folge c1, c2, . . .c1im Nullpunkt und jedes cv+1 = cv gewählt wird, mit
der einzige Ausnahme, daß ich, sobald von einer bestimmten fliehenden Eigenschaft
f mir eine Lösungszahl λf bekannt wird, das nächste cv gleich −2
−v−1wähle, und
daß ich, sobald mir eine Beweis der Absurdität dieser Lösungszahl bekannt wird, das
nächste cv gleich 2−v−1wähle. Dieses Element p ist von Null verschieden, ist aber
trotzdem weder kleiner als Null noch größer als Null.” ([Brouwer 1975, 436]).
6The choice sequence of [Brouwer 1991] has for the first time been recognised as
such and cited in [Dalen 1999]. No reconstruction is given. The fact that Brouwer
uses choice sequences in [Brouwer 1930] is mentioned there; they are not shown.
7There are two other choice sequences in [Brouwer 30], on [Brouwer 1975, 437]
and on [Brouwer 1975, 438]. They are also in [Niekus 2002, 11].
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the values of the terms are made to depend on future mathematical
experiences of the one who constructs the sequence. In the examples
above Brouwer denotes with “I” or “we” the one who constructs it.
It is remarkable that Brouwer fell into inactivity after the introduc-
tion of these choice sequences. After [Brouwer 30] he hardly published
anything for more then fifteen years.
After the Second World War he became active again. His papers
of that period are characterised by what has been considered as a new
method, which is known as the method of the creative subject. We treat
the example from [Brouwer 48]. His proof of the non-equivalence of
apartness and inequality starts with the following definition:
Let α be a mathematical assertion that cannot be tested, i.e. for which
no method is known to prove either its absurdity or the absurdity of its
absurdity.
Then the creating subject can, in connection with this assertion α, create
an infinitely proceeding sequence a1, a2, a3, . . . according to the following
direction: As long as, in the course of choosing the an, the creating subject
has experienced neither the truth, nor the absurdity of α, an is chosen
equal to 0.
However, as soon as between the choice of ar−1 and ar the creating subject
has obtained a proof of the truth of α, ar as well as ar+v for every natural
number v is chosen equal to 2−r. And as soon as between the choice of
as−1 and as the creating subject has experienced the absurdity of α, as, as
well as as+v for every natural number v is chosen equal to −2
−s.
This infinitely proceeding sequence a1, a2, a3, . . . is positively convergent,
so it defines a real number ρ. ([Brouwer 1975, 478]).
There has been discussion about what the expression creating subject
could mean. Note that in Brouwer’s view mathematics consists of mental
constructions, created by the human individual. A definition, e.g. as
above, cannot be but a description of a construction, to be carried out by
that individual. As it seems to us, Brouwer denotes with the expression
creating subject the individual who can carry out the construction, where
he used “we” or “I” before. Interpreted this way, the definition in [Br 48]
is the same as in the examples of choice sequences above.
Brouwer himself remarks in the introduction of [Brouwer 48] that
he uses this example in his lectures from 1927, and there is no other
candidate in these lectures.
We conclude that Brouwer applies individual choice sequences, as
introduced in [Brouwer 91], in the method of the creative subject.
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4 Individual choice sequences — how to
treat them
Contrary to [Brouwer 91] and [Brouwer 30], Brouwer gives in [Brouwer
48] a detailed proof of the stated result, which we shall analyse in this
section. We shall take the expression the creating subject to denote any
mathematician, which could be ourselves. Therefore we shall use we in
our reconstruction, as Brouwer did in his early use of choice sequences.
Thus the sequence defining ρ in the definition given in [Brouwer 48]
above is a sequence we can construct. We reason about this sequence
before the construction actually has started, we just use the definition.
Since the terms of the sequence depend on our future mathematical
experience, we need principles for reasoning about the future. We start
with the formalisation of such principles.
Suppose the future to be divided into ω discrete stages. For a math-
ematical assertion ϕ and a natural number n
Gnϕ
is defined as: on the n-th stage from now we are going to have a proof of
ϕ. A proof of Gnϕ may depend on information coming free before stage
n, but it may also be the case that Gnϕ holds because we already have a
proof of ϕ now, since we suppose that a proof remains valid in the move
of time. This is expressed by adopting for all natural numbers m and n,
and for any mathematical assertion ϕ
Gnϕ⇒ Gn+mϕ. (1)
Let the present be stage 0, which is expressed by
ϕ⇔ G0ϕ. (2)
Then obviously, for any mathematical assertion
ϕ⇒ ∃nGnϕ is valid. (3)
From (3) immediately follows
¬∃nGnϕ⇒ ¬ϕ. (4)
The principles above are general principles for reasoning about future
mathematical activity. They will be used in the reconstruction below;
the basic step is (4).
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We repeat the definition of ρ in [Br 48] with “we” instead of “creating
subject”; A is a mathematical proposition which is not tested, i.e. we
have neither a proof of ¬A nor of ¬¬A now.
As long as, while choosing values for (an), we neither have attained
a proof of A nor of ¬A, we take an = 0. If we find a proof of A between
the choice of an−1 and an, we take an+m = 2−n for all m. If we find a
proof of ¬A between the choice an−1 and an we take an+m = −2−n for
all m.
The sequence (an) is convergent, so it defines a real number, say ρ.
We connect the definition of (an) with the introduced stages by taking
the division of stages such, that an is chosen at stage n. Given this
division, if for some k GkA holds, then ρ  2−k holds as well. So we
have
∃nGnA⇒ ρ > 0, (5)
and analogously
∃nGn¬A⇒ ρ < 0. (6)
Note that the newly introduced term GnA cannot be used in the defini-
tion of (an), e.g. by defining an = 0 iff neither GnA nor Gn¬A holds.
The fact that GnA is not valid now, does not exclude that we will find
a proof of A before stage n.
We are now ready for the proof. After the definition of ρ in [Brouwer
48] we cited in Section 3, Brouwer continues with:
If for this real number ρ the relation ρ > 0 were to hold, then ρ < 0 would
be impossible, so it would be certain α could never be proved to be absurd,
so the absurdity of the absurdity of α would be known, so α would be
tested, which it is not. Thus the relation ρ > 0 does not hold.
Further, if for the real number ρ the relation ρ < 0 were to hold, then ρ > 0
would be impossible, so it would be certain that α could never be proved
to be true, so the absurdity of α would be known, so again α would be
tested, which it is not. Thus the relation ρ < 0 does not hold.
Finally let us suppose that the relation ρ = 0 holds. In this case neither
ρ < 0 nor ρ > 0 could ever be proved, so neither the absurdity nor the truth
of α could ever be proved, so the absurdity as well as the absurdity of the
absurdity of α would be known. This is a contradiction, so the relation
ρ = 0 is absurd, in other words the real numbers ρ and 0 are different.
([Brouwer 1975, 478-479]).
We rewrite the first paragraph of this proof as follows:
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If ρ > 0 holds, then ¬(ρ < 0) holds, so ¬∃nGn¬A holds, so ¬¬A
holds, and A would be tested. Since A is not tested, ρ > 0 does not
hold.
Crucial in this rewriting is that “it would be certain that α could never
be proved to be absurd” is expressed by ¬∃nGn¬A. The reasoning in
the rewritten paragraph is valid because of the following implications:
1. ρ > 0⇒ ¬(ρ < 0)
2. ¬(ρ < 0)⇒ ¬∃nGn¬A because of (6)
3. ¬∃nGn¬A⇒ ¬¬A because of (4).
Analogously, if ρ < 0 were to hold, ¬A, and so the fact that A is tested,
would follow from
1. ρ < 0⇒ ¬(ρ > 0)
2. ¬(ρ > 0)⇒ ¬∃nGnA because of (5)
3. ¬∃nGnA⇒ ¬A because of (4).
So ρ < 0 does not hold either.
However, if ρ = 0 were to hold, it would follow from
1. ρ = 0⇒ ¬(ρ < 0)
2. ¬(ρ < 0)⇒ ¬∃nGn¬A
3. ¬∃nGn¬A⇒ ¬¬A
and from
4. ρ = 0⇒ ¬(ρ > 0)
5. ¬(ρ > 0)⇒ ¬∃nGnA
6. ¬∃nGnA⇒ ¬A
that ¬A and ¬¬A were to hold, which is a contradiction, i.e. ρ = 0 does
hold.
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5 The standard reconstruction
In this last section we would like to point out the difference between our
reconstruction of [Brouwer 1975] and the standard one in intuitionistic
research ([Troelstra 1988, 842-846]). In the standard reconstruction the
expression creating subject is changed in creative subject and interpreted
as the idealised mathematician (for short IM).8 The ω discrete stages
cover all the mathematical activity of the IM, and do not, as in our
version, extend from the present to the future before us. The basic
notion of the resulting theory of the creative subject (for short TCS) is:
the IM has a proof of ϕ at stage n. We express this by Inϕ. The TCS
consists of the following axioms; n and m natural numbers, φ can be any
mathematical assertion:
Inϕ ∨ ¬Inϕ for all n (7)
Inϕ⇒ In+mϕ for all n and m (8)
ϕ⇒ ∃nInϕ (9)
∃nInϕ⇒ ϕ (10)
For a proposition A we can define (an) by
• an = 0 if ¬InA & ¬In¬A
• an = 2
−m if ∃m(m < n & ¬ImA & Im+1A)
• an = −2
−m if ∃m(m < n & ¬Im¬A & Im+1¬A).
Brouwer’s result is obtained as follows. Let ρ is the real number
generated by (an).
A follows from ρ > 0 because of
1. ρ > 0⇒ ∃nInA
2. ∃nInA⇒ A because of (10).
Analogously ¬A follows from ρ < 0 because
1. ρ < 0⇒ ∃nIn¬A
2. ∃nIn¬A⇒ ¬A because of (10).
8In the recent [Atten 2004, 64-71] again creating subject is used, but the inter-
pretation is as in [Troelstra 1988].
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So for this reconstruction it is sufficient that A is an undecided propo-
sition. It does not explain why Brouwer did resort to an untested proposi-
tion. In our reconstruction in section IV above the principle comparable
with (10),
∃nGnϕ⇒ ϕ (11)
is not valid; it would eliminate the distinction we want to make with Gn.
Therefore, the untestedness is necessary in our reconstruction.
Finally we remark that the standard reconstruction has never been
connected with the work of Brouwer in the late twenties.
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